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Today most Friends know intuitively that Quakers have been one ofthe most important political forces in American history. When
scholars assume, as, for example, Caroline Robbins has, that Quakers
may be “safely neglected” in the study of Anglo-American constitu-
tionalism, Friends chuckle and shake their heads.1 Yet, although their
actions have been well documented—their vital role in securing reli-
gious liberty, abolition, and women’s rights—the Quaker contribution
to the ideas and political processes of the American polity has remained
unarticulated. My purpose here is to give a brief overview of the sev-
enteenth-century origins of the Quaker theologico-political thought
and civic engagement.2 
The most tangible political legacy of Quakerism is the theory and
practice of civil disobedience.3 To many this may seem obvious, but the
scholarship on civil disobedience almost invariably begins with
Thoreau, with Quakers receiving only a cursory nod for their aboli-
tionism. But the practice was fully developed by Quakers almost two-
hundred years earlier. Moreover, they actively disseminated their
theory and practice of it well beyond their Society since then. In fact,
Thoreau, though not actually a civil disobedient himself, drew on
Quaker ideas of dissent.4
The much less obvious contribution of Quakerism to American
political culture is the theory behind the civil disobedience. For a pro-
gram of disobedience to be legitimate and effective, it must properly be
understood as the by-product of something larger. Any coherent the-
ory or methodical practice of dissent—whatever form it may take—it
must be preceded by and premised on a political theory that reveres the
constituted polity. In other words, there is no such thing as dissent in
anarchy. As my title suggests, the Quaker contribution to American
politics hinges on two important ideas: first, obligation, that is, the
duty to respect and obey the fundamental constitution of the polity;
and second, dissent about policy, which means to disagree with estab-
lished laws and norms and, perhaps, to disobey them. Quaker civil dis-
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obedience exemplifies these concepts and practices. Indeed, it was the
Quakers’ theologico-political theory of a civil constitution that allowed
the idea and practice of civil disobedience to arise. For the next few
pages I will outline the Quaker theory of constitutionalism and explain
how civil disobedience was the logical outgrowth of it. My intention
here is not to present new information about Quaker theology, but
rather, to fit what we know about it into a new framework that lets us
consider Quakerism from another angle—a political one.
Quaker political thought and action came directly from their expe-
rience of the origin, form, and function of an ecclesiastical constitution
and appropriate behavior within the faith community.5 In fact, in most
cases, there is little difference between their ecclesiastical theory and
their political theory. Therefore, for the purposes here, Quaker theolo-
gy and church government may be considered interchangeably with
their political theory and the corresponding structures.
LEGAL DISCERNMENT
The early Quakers’ unique understanding of a constitution grew from
their casuistic epistemology of fundamental (i.e. divine) law.
Understanding divine law was both an individual and group effort. At
first, the individual’s job was to discern God’s law through the Light.
In his political treatises, William Penn called this process of knowing
God’s law synteresis.6 This process was a markedly different view from
other political philosophers of the day who held that the law of
nature—as opposed to divine law—was known through reason.
Thinkers such as Locke were expressly opposed to the idea that man
could know law through an inner Light.7 Quakers, by contrast, believed
that all other ways of knowing were creations of man, and thus sec-
ondary. These included Scripture, history, custom, and reason. Ideally,
these things should comport with the Light—they should be based on
it—but because they were of man, they could be fallible, corrupted, and
contradictory. In other words, the spirit was never contradictory, but
man’s interpretation of it could be. Thus, secondary guides should be
tested against the Light, and if there were a discrepancy between them,
the Light was to be obeyed. This way, man adhered to the “living spir-
it” of God’s law rather than the “dead letter.” 
The process of legal discernment began in the individual’s relation-
ship with God, but it did not remain a solitary one. The Light in each
individual must be combined with others to form a coherent under-
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standing of God’s will. Quakers were thus compelled to seek each other
out and worship as a group. This group constituted an informal soci-
ety, one that was governed directly by God without the use of man-
made structures. The unity in the Light was a sacred bond that
constituted the meeting and allowed them to discern God’s funda-
mental law and follow the order it prescribed. The communal aspect of
Quakerism was thus as important as the individual aspect.
THE ORIGINS OF GOVERNMENT
Quakers believed that man in the state of nature, or prelapsarian man,
as they would have understood it, had need of government well beyond
the purpose of protecting individual rights. Contrary to other views on
the origins of government, which considered it a “necessary evil,”
designed primarily to “Terrifie evil-doers,” Penn asserts, “They weakly
Err, that think there is no other use for Government, than Correction,
which is the coarsest part of it: Daily experience tells us, that the Care
and Regulation of many other Affairs, more soft and daily necessary
make up the greatest part of Government.”8
Thus the need for government should not be seen as a failure on the
part of man to fulfill God’s will, but rather as part of a providential
process. Robert Barclay explained that God “hath gathered and is gath-
ering us into the good Order, Discipline, and Government” of Christ.9
It is not a discrete event with a beginning and an end, but an on-going
process in which the fundamental constitution and government are
formed early by God and then, as the need arises, are solidified in
divinely ordained but man-made structures. Accordingly, in the late
1650s, Fox, along with other leaders, began to organize local meetings
around England.
The overarching purpose for establishing government was to pre-
serve the unity of the meeting. Unity was crucial for several reasons—
to discern the law; to facilitate charitable works; protection from
atomizing forces from within; and protection from destructive forces
from without. As Penn said, “Our Civil Union is Our Civil Safety.”10
The two most pressing concerns of Friends who saw the need for
church government were the discernment of the law and the “scatter-
ing” tendency of the doctrine of the inward Light. While Quakers were
still functioning under the direct governance of God, without a formal
church government, they soon encountered the problem of where
authority lay; in other words, whose interpretation of God’s law should
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prevail: the individual’s or the group’s? The rapid growth of Quakerism
combined with the enthusiasm of some members, threatened to dis-
unite the meeting. Some Friends challenged what was becoming the
standard interpretation of how the meeting should function and what
defined a good Quaker. 
THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS
With the need for government identified, Fox and other leading
Friends moved to solidify the authority of the church government
through new structures. Barclay argued that not only is government as
such ordained by God, so too is the form it should take and the
processes by which it should function: the “order and method.”11 The
“order”—the governmental structure—was to be something like a fed-
eral system with governing bodies organized hierarchically and geo-
graphically. Local meetings met monthly and quarterly, and they were
themselves governed by a strong central body that met annually, and to
which the local bodies sent representatives. 
The “method” of governance—the decision-making process—was
also divinely ordained, and Quakers saw it as one of the most important
components of their faith. They believed that a particular process must
be followed if God’s Truth were to be accurately discerned. Decisions
were to involve both individual and communal efforts, and they were
to be made according to specified procedures. The Quaker emphasis on
spiritual equality has led some to see the meeting as a pure democracy,
but that is to misunderstand the Quaker genius.2 It is true that all men
(that is, all people) were created (spiritually) equal in that all had the
equal opportunity to receive, discern, and express God’s Light in their
consciences. But all persons have not received equal measures of the
Light, nor did they have equal powers of discernment, or facilities of
expression. There was a definite hierarchy giftedness and weightiness
that members were admonished to respect. Barclay explained that God
gives “unto ever member a measure of the same Spirit, yet divers,
according to the Operation, for the Edification of the Body.”13 Thus,
while every member of the meeting had a voice, not all voices had equal
weight. We might consider this system a representative democracy with
the participatory element determined by a sort of aristocracy of spirit.14
In other words, there was an element of liberty in the meeting, but it
was far from the liberal democracy we know today. Equality of access to
the divine will does not imply equity of its discernment.
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In theory, this division of insight and abilities, however, would cre-
ate a surprisingly equitable distribution of power when functioning
within a unified meeting. While the preponderance of the power to
decide the direction of the meeting lay with the weighty Friends and
the majority of the members, there was an obligation incumbent upon
the whole meeting to respect the voice of the dissenting minority. Since
the goal of the meeting was to come to a unified sense of God’s will—
which was the only way to understand it correctly—and because God
might give any individual member, no matter his or her worldly stand-
ing, a clearness that he had not bestowed on the others, all voices need-
ed to be reckoned with according to their weight. Thus when an
impasse was reached at a crucial juncture, rather than run roughshod
over the dissenting members, the body of the meeting would try to
convince the dissenters of their understanding. In theory, there was no
spiritual oligarchy or democratic despotism in a Quaker meeting. 
Of course, as the meeting grew and individual members had variant
interpretations of the Light, disagreement became more frequent. A
schism known as the Wilkinson-Story Controversy demonstrated the
tensions.15 In 1675 a number of Friends separated from the Society
under protest that the new meetings were conducted under a spirit of
outward (that is, man-made) authority and that there was too much
control over the behavior of individuals. They saw Fox as someone who
was “over-driving, imposing, lording over Men’s Consciences, setting
up in the Church another government then that of the Spirit.”16 This
dissent threatened to disunite the movement.
But dissent in itself was not an undesirable element of the discern-
ment process. Indeed, it was a critical part of the Quaker meeting as a
way to the Truth. The Truth, explained Barclay, might be “divers in its
Appearance,” and if the dissent “layeth not a real Ground for Division
or Dissension of Spirit, Fellow Members ought not only to bear one
another, but strengthen one another in [it].”17 For Quakers, bringing
the Light of Truth to the community through dissent was a form of
proselytizing. There was a special commission placed with the individ-
ual to follow Christ’s example and “[give] Witness to the Dispensation
of the Gospel.”18 They ought not to remain silent.19 Progressive revela-
tion necessitated openness to variant interpretations of the Light;
because God might speak through anyone, all voices must be heard.
However, as important as Truth-seeking was, it was not more
important than the unity and harmony of the meeting. Indeed, because
the discernment of Truth was also a communal effort, it was inextrica-
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bly bound with the preservation of the fundamental constitution of the
polity. Quakers therefore had a sense of political obligation of the high-
est order. As Barclay asserted, “The Honor of Truth [was] prostrated
by Divisions.”20
Therefore, just as it was incumbent upon the majority to hear dis-
sent as a way to the Truth, the dissenter was equally obliged to follow
a prescribed method to preserve the unity. This process was based on
the peace testimony, which was the conviction that God’s creations
must not be harmed or destroyed. In this case, this meant the divinely
constituted polity. The dissenter must first purify his motives and
approach the meeting in humility as Christ’s agent. If, however, the
meeting does not hear him at first, he must then exercise, as Barclay
said, “Forbearance in Things, wherein [the others] have not yet
attained; yet . . . [the dissenter] must walk so, as they have him for an
Example.” Although some individuals may have a more advanced
understanding than the group, in time, Quakers believed, God would
eventually reveal the Truth to all.21 If still there was no unified sense, the
matter must be put aside for the time being so as not to jeopardize the
fundamental unity and harmony of the polity. Dissent thus should be a
process of persuasion and convincement, not coercion. The difficulty
came when the dissenters did not respect the process and asserted their
interpretation of the Truth in a disruptive way. The wrong and right
ways to dissent are best exemplified in the abolitionism of Benjamin
Lay—who called Quaker slave-owners apostates and was eventually dis-
owned—and John Woolman—who waited patiently, persuaded gently,
and played a major role in instituting the anti-slavery testimony among
Friends.22
CODIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES—THE WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION
Now that we have a sense of how the polity was constituted and the
processes that animated it, we come to the written constitution. In
1669 as the Quaker leaders worked to establish the central church gov-
ernment, Fox, acting as a representative of the body, drew up the first
Discipline of the unified meeting. The Discipline was the Quakers’
ecclesiastical constitution. Its title is Canons and institutions drawn up
and agreed upon by the General Assembly or Meeting of the Heads of the
Quakers from all parts of the kingdom . . . January 1668/9, George Fox
being their president. Very much like the civil constitutions that were
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being written at this time, it was a statement of the origins and purpose
of the Quaker meeting and codification of the divine law that Friends
had discerned collectively and transcribed thus far. 
According to Friends, this constitution and its government was,
because of its origins in a divine process of discernment, perfect in its
fundamental elements and therefore sacred. William Penn said that
“Government is sacred in its institution and end.” Because it was
sacred, it was perpetual. Barclay explained how the constitution arose
from the “method” of the meeting. The creation of the Discipline was
a case in which “the Judgment of a certain Person or Persons in certain
. . . is infallible” and for this reason, it was appropriate for this General
Assembly to “pronounce it as obligatory upon others.”23 But—and here
is the crucial point—he also says that the infallibility of this judgment
“is not because [these men] are infallible, but because in these Things,
and at that Time they were led by the infallible Spirit.”24 Therefore, in
so far as the written constitution was in keeping with the spirit, it was
perfect and perpetual. If aspects of it were not discerned in the right
spirit, however, they would not be binding. Quaker political theorist
Isaac Penington wrote that “He who is of counsel with the Lord, may
know what he intends,” but man must be wary of becoming “the great
Introducer” of bad laws.25 This meant that the written constitution was
not a static thing. It was a living entity, flexible and amendable to
remain in keeping with the spirit. It was a secondary guide like
Scripture—as Barclay said, “a Declaration of the Fountain but not the
Fountain it self.” Likewise, Penn said, the civil constitution is “not the
Original Establishment, but a Declaration and Confirmation of that
Establishment.”26 Therefore, “Seasons and Times,” explained Barclay,
“do not alter the Nature and Substance of Things in themselves;
though it may cause Things to alter, as to the Usefulness, or not
Usefulness of them.”27 In other words, although the fundamental law
embodied in the constitution was eternal, changes in the written docu-
ment might be necessary in order to apply the law as times changed and
as God gave man greater clearness of his will. 
The flexibility of the Quaker constitution is evidenced in its evolu-
tion from the seventeenth to the late-eighteenth century. The 1669
Discipline was sixteen pages long; by 1798 it was 135 pages. Over the
years it was rewritten and expanded, and it evolved to include a pream-
ble that stated more clearly the purpose of the Quaker meeting, new
laws that governed, it clarification or amendment of old laws, and fea-
tures to make it more useful as a reference tool for members, such as a
table of contents and an index.28 But, as testimony to the infallibility of
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the Spirit’s leading the original General Assembly, despite some admin-
istrative changes over the years, the essence of it remained the same,
including the very language used. 
Quakers transferred their understanding of an ecclesiastical theory
to the civil sphere virtually wholesale and treated the civil polity as the
meeting writ large. But other Englishmen did not share their vision of
the constitution.29 In the English government there was no peaceful,
methodical process for changing a constitution and limiting an oppres-
sive government. People believed either that the government had a
right to impose its authority and that they must submit regardless of the
injustice, or that if the government overstepped its bounds it could be
overthrown through revolution. In the seventeenth-century, Quakers
felt governmental oppression more acutely than most; their persecution
is well-documented. But they were not satisfied with either of these the-
ories of government. With their understanding of a constitution that
was both sacred and amendable through peaceful means, they originat-
ed a process of dissent that limited government while demonstrating a
strong sense of political obligation to the structures and principles that
bound the polity together. Quakers wrote the first civil constitution
with an amendment clause.30 Before this, however, they engaged in civil
disobedience and other forms of peaceful dissent. 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Three hundred years later, the steps that Martin Luther King, Jr. advo-
cated for civil disobedients were exactly the same methods used by
Quakers to publicize their testimonies and combat their persecution. In
his Letter from Birmingham Jail (April 16, 1963), King laid out the
specific directives for undertaking an effective program of civil disobe-
dience. “In any nonviolent campaign,” he explained, “there are four
basic steps.” The first, he says, is the “collection of the facts to deter-
mine whether injustices exist.” This was the very reason why Friends
organized the Meeting for Sufferings, effectively a legal advocacy
group. The second step is attempted “negotiation” with the authori-
ties. According to the Quakers’ critics, “[N]o people upon the Earth,
seek more to the Higher Powers, than they do; it would be too tedious
to recite the many Petitions, and Addresses to the Parliament, from the
beginning for This, That, and the Other Favour.”31 Here we see that
there is clearly not a “withdrawal” from government, as some scholars
have claimed, but a more intimate engagement with it.32 Third, there
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must be a process of “self-purification” to be sure the dissenter is act-
ing from disinterested motives. For Quakers, this was an on-going
process, and a main function of the meeting for worship. Then comes
the “direct action”—the actual breaking of the law—where Quakers
would, as King described, “present our very bodies as a means of lay-
ing our case before the conscience of the local and the national com-
munity.”33 Friends considered themselves to be the “First Publishers of
Truth” as they physically protested unjust laws. King goes on:
“Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a
tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is
forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue so that it
can no longer be ignored.” But of course, for King, as for the Quakers,
it was more than this. “One who breaks an unjust law,” King empha-
sized, “must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the
penalty.”34 Passive acceptance of punishments, and indeed martyrdom,
was a very important part of early Quaker testifying, as it was for King.
It was no coincidence that King learned much of his theory of civil dis-
sent from Quakers.35
Quaker thought and practice was an apparent contradiction for
their contemporaries. They simply could not categorize Friends’ behav-
ior into familiar groupings because they had never seen anything like it
before. They did not understand the meaning of a people who in the
same breath could say to the king that “[Quakers] never sought to
detract from thee, or to render thee and thy Government odious to the
people,” and yet that “it is not lawful for any whatsoever, by virtue of
any authority or principality they bear in the government of this world,
to force the consciences of others.”36 This was a new understanding of
government and civic engagement. It was a form of popular participa-
tion rooted in a collective understanding of the form and function of
government. Quakers needed to have a tremendous amount of faith in
the English constitution and its prescribed legal system for them to
have embraced it so. They somehow knew that the remedy for the ills
came from the same source as the cause; the constitution merely need-
ed reform. Their detractors did not yet understand that civil disobedi-
ence, as disruptive as it can be, is based on a strong sense of political
obligation and a deep respect for the constitution of the state. The
Quakers, wrote a cynical critic, “repeal, not verbally, yet virtually, so far
as their Power reaches, all Acts of Parliament which suit not their Light
Within.”37 This detractor, however, did not go far enough. Gradually,
over many decades, Quakers did, in fact, succeed in actually repealing
many of the laws that did not agree with their understanding of the
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Light. Bearing witness to the Truth evoked convincement beyond a
small movement and came to have an impact upon liberties of con-
science within the larger society as well.
Most historians date the origins of this concept of a perpetual, yet
amendable constitution at the American founding. Yet it is clear that
the idea was in circulation among Friends in their ecclesiastical polity
and in the civil polities in which they moved. It animated and defined
Quaker political engagement from the English Interregnum until
today. Some political historians have called the character of King’s
non-violent protest “distinctive.”38 While his role in bringing this
form of dissent into the modern American consciousness should not
be underestimated, the precident for that distinction clearly belongs
to the Quakers.
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